ABSTRACT In recent years, the degree of choice in education systems has increased in most countries. Still, the variation of choice policies across countries is substantial. The authors ask under what combinations of conditions (i.e. institutional features of education systems) choice policy succeeds in balancing educational efficiency and equity. Using the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, they investigate the impact of seven institutional conditions in 20 European countries. Those seven conditions are identified in school choice literature as relevant in explaining variations in educational efficiency and equity. The analysis shows that there are multiple causal paths to good policy outcome. The main contribution of this article is to show that 'choice' is an INUS condition (i.e. an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient combination of conditions) and that 'no tracking' is a necessary condition for educational efficiency and equity. In addition, the authors show that 'good management' and 'competition' of schools contribute to good educational outcomes only in choicetolerant countries.
Introduction
In the last 25 years, market elements -such as increased 'consumer' choice, published performance indicators and financial reward for success -have been introduced in many areas of public policy, including education. More than two-thirds of member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have increased school choice opportunities for parents (OECD, 2010) , and school choice is perhaps one of the most ardently discussed issues in the current education policy debate. The initial instruments of school choice (e.g. Friedman, 1955) , enforced mainly in England and the United States, were related to equal opportunities for education and included different types of government-funded voucher schemes to support students of different backgrounds in attending private schools or those with good reputations. However, today's interpretation of school choice is more triggered by the wave of decentralisation of education as a part of a bigger movement within new public management (NPM) and in this context the problem points to the reforms which gave parents the right to influence the decisions concerning the allocation of pupils to schools. The NPM arguments for school choice have been more focused on efficiency than on equity concerns.
In this analysis we define school choice as one component of the complex configuration of educational governance. However, the design of the school choice policy is not only a simple theoretical matching exercise. Various institutional features -some of them path-dependent -enter into the game. Policy literature has argued that school systems based on informed choice among autonomous schools improve student achievement by creating incentives for students, parents, teachers, schools and administrators to provide the best learning environment and to bring about innovation (Le Grand, 2007; Woessmann et al, 2009; Musset, 2012) . However, on empirical grounds there is interdisciplinary cross-country evidence that choice segregates, meaning that lessadvantaged families and students will rather DO YOU MEAN THEY PREFER TO GO TO THESE SCHOOLS OR THAT THEY END UP GOING TO THESE SCHOOLS? go to the local, less prestigious schools (the following are just some references out of many: West, 2006 ; Böhlmark & Lindahl, 2007 NOT IN REFS -PLEASE SUPPLY DETAILS; Kiltgaard, 2007; Willmore, 2008; Riedel et al, 2009; West & Ylönen, 2009; Bukowska & Siwinska-Gorzelak, 2011 ). Thus we are after not just matching principles or quasi-market design, but also 'widely defined' institutional design.
Inspired by empirical ambiguity and a paradigmatic shift of governance towards active citizenship and a fading polarisation of choice models, we define our research problems as follows:
(1) What are the necessary and sufficient combinations of conditions (institutional features of educational policy) to achieve educational efficiency and equity? (2) What kind of causal paths, including less choice tolerance, manage to find a balance between educational efficiency and equity? In the terms of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), the balanced mix of educational efficiency and equity is the so-called good outcome resulting from various combinations of conditions.[1] In our case these institutional conditions are: availability of school choice; the system's ability to track students; availability of early childhood education; share of private providers; funding principles of private contributors; autonomy and accountability of the schools. We have three testable hypotheses about the relationships between outcome and combinations of conditions. First, 'no tracking' is a necessary condition for producing equity and efficiency within the education system. By no tracking we mean that in primary and lower secondary levels of education children are not grouped according to their ability into different schools or within school into different classes.
Second, 'configure choice properly' hypotheses HYPOTHESIS -meaning that there are combinations of educational institutional features which manage to avoid the compromise between educational efficiency and equity and rather allow complementarity between these dual priorities. The second hypothesis has two parts -'competition' and 'good management', controlling for policy mixes that are applicable only in the case of school choice cases (like Sweden, Netherland, England or Ireland). The first part tests the idea that the share of private providers and incentivising funding matters; the second part alternatively tests whether accountability and autonomy are vital for the good outcome.
Third, 'choice' is an INUS condition.
[2] This means that parental freedom to choose is one of the necessary components in the solution configuration which produces educational efficiency and equity, but this is not the only solution. There are other sufficient solution configurations (paths) as well, where choice is not a component. To produce the outcome, choice has to be in the configuration with other conditions (institutional features) to constitute the sufficient combination.
To answer the research questions we use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fuzzy-set QCA). We find the method appealing not only because of its novelty, but mainly because we believe that there exists a research gap -that is, most researches are case specific; 'conventional' methods fail because of the complexity of institutional set-ups and the limited number of observations. Fuzzy-set QCA can be used as a bridge between qualitative and quantitative design as it allows for difference in kind (qualitative anchors) and difference in degree (calibration of conditions), as Ragin (2008) indicates. Also it implies that different causal paths -each path being relevant in a distinctive way -may lead to the same outcome. In other words, it enables the analysis of equifinality.
We continue as follows. First, we discuss existing policy literature and make our hypothesis formulation transparent. Second, we indicate the data and sources for the analysis. The third part shows the outcomes of fuzzy-set analysis and empirical typologies, aiming at testing our hypotheses (finding necessary and sufficient conditions). Finally, we develop policy implications based on our results.
Literature for Hypothesis Formulation
Policy literature is accumulating around the OECD 'comparative turn' by introducing new performance standards in education, new arrangements for education systems and new evaluation coordination (Martens et al, 2010). NOT IN REFS -PLEASE SUPPLY DETAILS While school choice is also a highly charged ideological battleground there is wide agreement that school systems need to be improved, but equally wide disagreement about the extent to which choice can produce it. Although it is quite common to distinguish between two opposite models of school choice -(1) the catchment area-based, more equity-oriented comprehensive system, and (2) the liberal, efficiency-seeking choice-based model, the opposition of these is not so dichotomised. Rather, most countries allow parents and students to select their school from a diverse array of choice, even though the majority of countries rely mostly on public schools to provide education at the primary and lower secondary levels (Eurydice, 2012) . Nowadays, initial geographical assignment in elementary school is frequently accompanied by more flexible choice options later on in lower-secondary or secondary levels of education in most OECD countries.
Even the countries which have tried to resist the choice-supportive policy initiatives have acknowledged that even without any formal choice mechanisms, some parents still find ways to exercise choice and choose the school for their children, finding ways to go around the official policies, by declaring another address than their real residence, for example, buying into a neighbourhood to gain access to a particular school, or even engaging themselves in the definition of catchment boundaries (e.g. Musset, 2012) . As this capacity is strongly linked to their social, cultural and economic resources, it is considered un-equitable INEQUITABLE and this is one of the reasons that leads countries to the introduction of more straightforward choice models instead of latent self-regulated ways of CONSTRUCTING choice strategies. Taking the last argument into account and developing it with the expanding literature on active citizenship (e.g. Newman & Clarke, 2009; Lauri, 2013) Le Grand, 2007; Woessmann, 2008; Musset, 2012) have been optimistic about designing choice policies which offer a good policy mix -that is, they argue that it is possible to determine the conditions that a policy based on choice and competition needs to fulfil to meet the efficiency and equity criteria. Based on the aforementioned authors, there are basically three criteria which have to be kept in mind when designing choice policies: (1) increasing the ability of users to make choices (e.g. parents must be properly informed about the quality of the alternatives, supporting transportation); (2) decreasing the ability of providers to make choices (e.g. to avoid creamskimming by quota, lottery or central criteria); and (3) widening the extent of competition (competition must be real). Woessmann et al, (2009) and Woessmann and Schütz (2006) indicate that efficiency and equity must not be perceived inevitably as substitutes -certain policies may use the two aims in such a way that they complement each other. According to them, the efficiency-enhancing educational reforms in Europe, which have not caused any well-documented compromise with equity, have been policies that introduce competition, choice and market forces into the school system. However, since public funding may increase the set of choices for poor families, the positive effect of public funding may be another aspect of the skill-enhancing capacity of school choice and competition. Thus, school systems based on public-private partnerships where the state finances schools but contracts their operation out to the private sector seem to be the most effective school systems.
Another promising institutional structure that could, according to Woessmann et al (2009) , lead to substantial gains in many European education systems is a combination of accountability and school autonomy -that is, A COMBINATION OF institutional features that introduce accountability by externally testing and making public the quality of what students and schools deliver, creating the proper incentives to improve educational performance. And the third potential way to drive efficiency is related to teachers' quality and the financial instruments to motivate the better ones.
At the same time, one policy with a substantial negative impact on the equality of opportunity achieved in a school system is the timing of the tracking of students into different kinds of schools based on their ability (e.g. Woessmann & Schütz, 2006; Braga et al, 2013) . Another key solution for a more equitable school system, and the main argument based on the skill multiplier effect, is the extensive system of early education in terms of both duration and enrolment. In addition, targeted vouchers and the improvement of the quality of the teaching have been mentioned as evidence-based instruments for educational equity enhancement. Woessman and Schütz (2006) conclude that, after considering the mentioned policy initiatives in Europe, there appears to be no strong evidence for a substantive trade-off between efficiency and equity at the system level. Rather, there is some evidence for complementarities of certain policies in raising both efficiency and equity, most notably for policies that increase early education, and welldesigned forms of choice and accountability.
Summing up the existing literature allows us to formulate three hypotheses about the institutional features of good policy mixes that lead to a good outcome. By policy mixes we consider combinations of conditions [3] , and the normative adjective 'good' indicates that they lead to an outcome that meets the 0.5 [CHANGED FROM 0,5 -OK?] threshold in the Boolean multiplication of efficiency and equity scores (see Appendix 1).
[4] Thus, these factors act together, configurationally, to produce the outcome under investigation. First, we hypothesise that tracking is harmful in any configurations, and thus we name it the 'no tracking' hypothesis:
where ~T indicates no tracking [5] and EFEQ is an outcome indicator -efficiency and equity of the educational system. Second, we have two policy mixes for controlling the 'configure choice properly' hypothesis that are not mutually exclusive. We investigate whether there are alternative combinations of educational institutional features under the aforementioned conditions of 'choice' and 'no tracking' which manage to avoid the compromise between educational efficiency and equity, and rather lead to complementarity between these dual priorities. The first of these combinations is:
or the so-called competition hypothesis, where E is the magnitude and comprehensiveness of early childhood education, P is the share of private schools, and F is the public contribution within a private system. And for less private provision-oriented cases (like many Eastern European systems), alternatively, the 'good management hypotheses' is:
where AC and AU stand for accountability and autonomy of schools. This latter one we call the 'good management hypothesis' because it entails aspects of school-specific decision tracks (see also section 3.2). Summing up (2.1) and (2.2), we can say that choice-no-tracking systems lead to good outcome via either a well-combined competitive MIX or a well-managed policy mix.
C*~T*E*((P*F) + (AC*AU))→EFEQ (2)

EQUATION 2 HERE -SHOULD THIS BE EQUATION 3?
In addition, we test whether 'choice' (C) is an INUS condition.
C + INUS condition (3)
EQUATION 3 HERE -SHOULD THIS BE EQUATION 4?
An INUS condition means technically in our case that choice (C) is an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient. By arguing that choice is INUS we claim that there are sufficient combinations of conditions which manage to obtain the outcome where C is one of the necessary conditions. But this combination with C itself is not necessary given that there are other paths, without C, to THE DESIRED outcome as well. Thus, there are choice-tolerant countries which obtain the good outcome (EFEQ), but their success is dependent on the other, additional necessary conditions of this success ('no tracking', for instance). But to obtain the outcome, countries can choose the 'no-choice' formulas as well -that is, choice is not the only strategy.
In the formula, '*' imply IMPLIES logical 'and', '+' IMPLIES logical 'or' and arrows show the necessary (←) or sufficient (→) relationships between configuration and outcome.
Data and Calibration
The empirical analysis focuses on 20 European educational systems. The research design enables us to create typologies of school choice policy and then test whether certain combinations of conditions OF membership elements contribute to the outcome. The latter means that we can investigate the substituting and complementing of the institutional features of policy reform. For operationalisation we chose available European-wide information -namely, PISA 2009, the Eurydice database and OECD indicators (see Appendix 2).
To allow for fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, we need to calibrate the raw data into fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets are membership scores of sets (conditions and outcomes) that are purposefully calibrated using our data sources and literature (see Appendices 1 and 2). This is the quantitative form of multiple secondary sources of information also with THAT ALSO HAVE qualitative breakpoints or thresholds, on the basis of which we can determine the dimension's degree of membership -that is, fully in or fully out and the crossover point (see Appendix 2 last column). We used two types of fuzzy scores: four values OF fuzzy sets for qualitative data, and continuous calibration for quantitative data. For calibration of the latter group and further fuzzy-set QCA analysis we used the open access software fsQCA 2.5.
Outcome
The goals of education policy are usually twofold, encompassing both goals of efficient allocation and goals of equitable distribution (Woessmann & Schütz, 2006) . But in some cases, efficiency and equity goals may be independent from (orthogonal to) one another. In other cases, there may be trade-offs in the extent to which the two goals can be obtained. We are simultaneously after both educational efficiency and equity, which technically means application of the Boolean minimisation rule of two separate outcome indicators.
We operationalise the equity (EQ) of educational systems by using cross-country estimates of the family-background effect obtained by Schütz et al (2008) and more recently by Ferreira and Ginoux (2011) . In both cases 'equity scores' are first calibrated to the fuzzy scores according to qualitative anchors, and then averaged.
The concept of efficiency (EF) seems much more straightforward, but in reality it can indicate the cost efficiency of the system or the distributional efficiency. Many studies ) have indicated that increased financing has not affected educational results much. Thus, our operationalisation has no financing dimension, and we just used the PISA 2009 combined country scores, which are calculated according to average scores in mathematics, reading and science.
As Figure 1 indicates, there are two camps of countries, the first group with high equity and efficiency scores (e.g. Finland, Netherlands, Denmark, etc.), and the second groups having low scores (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.). For operationalising good policy outcome (EFEQ) we used the minimum rule; thus, individual country scores will be indicated by the lowest category from the two shown in Figure 1 .
Conditions
First, our central condition is the scope and degree of choice (C) within the school system. We see that the catchment-area-based CORRECT TO ADD HYPHENS? school 'choice' is diminishing, but it is still an existing trend. However, most of the countries have some form of choice available, although the degree of choice and its regulation differs. There are countries -England, Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands -where institutional arrangements that support choice have been revealed as clear policy direction, while in others -in Finland and Denmark, for instance -choice is rather a latent result of policies that are not designed for choice, but do not prohibit it. Note: All country labels marked by grey satisfy good outcome condition in both dimensions (EQ and EF are above 0.5 thresholds).
SCHUETZ IN THE FIGURE SHOULD BE SPELLED SCHÜTZ FOR CONSISTENCY. EDUCATIONAL ON THE X AND Y AXES SHOULD HAVE A CAPITAL LETTER. PLEASE SUPPLY A CORRECTED FIGURE
Choice condition (C) in this particular analysis is based on the Eurydice classification. According to this, parents in the majority of European countries are in a position to influence decisions relating to the allocation of students to public and government-dependent private schools, although to a varying extent. Eurydice (2012) indicates four identifiable models of allocation (i.e. choice models in the sense of this article): (1) children are allocated to a specific school by the public authorities based on geographical criteria (catchment area-based assignment); (2) children are allocated to a school, but parents may request an alternative; (3) parents choose a school, but the public authorities may intervene if it is over-subscribed (similar to the controlled-choice model); (4) parents choose a school, with no action by the public authorities to regulate pupil numbers. See Appendices 1 and 2 for more details.
Our second condition is tracking (T), indicating stratification of schools or classes within the school. A school system is characterised by tracking when pupils are allocated, at some stage of their school career, to different tracks, which usually differ in the curriculum offered as well as in the average motivation of enrolled students. In the North American context tracking is rather called ability grouping or streaming within a fully comprehensive schooling structure, which is also common to many Eastern European countries. In the orthodox European context tracking takes the form of well-defined separate segments in the education process, typically specialising in general and vocational education. Insofar as allocation to tracks is non-random, school tracking introduces selection into the schooling process, which may take several forms, ranging from self-selection to admission based on a test or on teachers' recommendations. In most cases, selection is affected, directly or indirectly, by family background.
As the phenomenon of tracking can be determined either by individual-level ability grouping or by the structural level of a differentiated system, we used the average of two complementary measures: ability grouping (AG) based on PISA 2009 data, and streaming (S) based on Eurydice 2012 data. See Appendix 1 and 2 for more details.
Third, we operationalise early childhood education (E). The literature seems to agree on the positive effects of early childhood education on both efficiency and equity in the education system. The evidence behind this is usually explained in various models developed by James Heckman and co-authors describing the technology of skill formation (Woessmann & Schütz, 2006; Braga et al, 2011) . They also show the impact on equity because the rates of return from early education investments tend to be higher for children from disadvantaged families, while at older ages they tend to be higher for children from well-off families. The cross-country evidence also shows that more extensive systems of pre-school education -in terms of both enrolment and durationsignificantly increase equality of opportunity, as indicated by the lower dependence of eighth-grade students' test scores on their family background. Thus, we operationalise condition (E) as a country's enrolment rate in early education at age three according to OECD Education at Glance 2012 data (see Appendices 1 and 2 for more detailed data).
Our fourth condition is the availability of a considerable number of private providers in a country's school system (P) (see Appendix 1 and 2 for more details). Our standpoint here comes from choice literature (Woessmann, 2009; Woessmann et al, 2009; Põder et al, 2012) 2013 IN REFS which states that systems need diversity (not in prestige terms) to enable meaningful choice, and that the state is not necessarily the best provider of education for all students. This is also often the rationale for subsidies for religious schools. Some countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, have a long history of church-schooling. Recent research has shown that public operation has a negative effect, but public funding of private or denominational schools has a positive effect on student achievements (Woessmann, 2009 ). We operationalise this condition (P) based on the Eurydice (2012), where P stands for the share of students (ISCED 1-3) in private, either government dependent or private independent schools IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS, EITHER GOVERNMENT DEPENDENT OR PRIVATE INDEPENDENT. According to Eurydice, a government-dependent private institution is either one that receives 50% or more of its core funding from government or one whose teaching personnel is paid by government. On the contrary, an independent private institution is one that receives less than 50% of its core funding from government or one whose teaching personnel are not paid by government.
Our fifth condition is related to the previous point, equalising the selection effect of private enrolment. We consider the proportion of public money in the private system -funding (F) -to be vital for equity, but it is not the sole factor. As indicated in the previous section, countries with a larger share of privately operated schools perform better in international achievement tests. At the same time, across countries, larger sums of public funding (as opposed to operation) are associated with better student outcomes (Woessmann & Schütz, 2006) . Since public funding may increase the set of choices for poor families, the positive effect of public funding may be another aspect of the skill-enhancing capacity of school choice and competition. Thus, school systems based on publicprivate partnerships where the state finances schools but contracts their operation out to the private sector seem to be the most effective school systems. We use data from OECD Education at Glance 2012 to operationalise this condition (see Appendices 1 and 2). On average among OECD countries, at all levels of education combined, public expenditure per student to ON public institutions is nearly twice the public expenditure to ON private institutions (OECD, 2012) .
Sixth, we operationalise accountability (AC) by using PISA 2009 data. For the score we use the availability of central examinations (see Appendices 1 and 2 for more details). There are various instruments to proxy school accountability. In recent literature the presence of central examinations (or other central testing) is used (e.g. Braga et al, 2013) because it is straightforward and allows for cross-school comparisons. Some countries have also associated a teacher-incentives scheme with the results of students' assessments (e.g. OECD, 2010), but their effects are shown to be ambiguous. The positive association between measures of accountability and student achievement is arguably the result of incentives provided by the state exams ). However, despite evidence showing that the introduction of test-based accountability increases average student achievement, different studies have found a negative impact on equality, since schools may become more selective in order to improve their scores, not necessarily changing the quality of the teaching (Braga et al, 2013) . Thus, it can be argued, following Woessmann and Schütz (2006) , that accountability and school autonomy in combination are needed for the efficiency gain, but the impact of this policy mix on equity has not been intensively studied.
Our seventh and final condition is the degree of autonomy (AU) of the schools. School autonomy or the decentralisation of decision-making is also expected to exert positive effects on student outcomes, because local decision-makers tend to have superior information to the central government. At the same time, where their interests are not strictly aligned, local decision-makers may act opportunistically unless they are held accountable for the achievement of their students (Braga et al, 2011) . We used one of the PISA 2009 composite indices, based on the school principals' survey. This index measures whether the school's governing board has considerable responsibility for allocating resources within the school (appointing and dismissing teachers, establishing teachers' starting salaries and salary increases, formulating school budgets and allocating them within the school).
Analysis
For fuzzy-set QCA we initially identified the necessary and only then sufficient (combinations of) conditions that bring about a good outcome. We first conducted an analysis of the necessary conditions as recommended by Schneider and Wagemann (2010) by testing our hypothesis indicated by equation (1).
Necessary Conditions
First, we identified causal conditions shared by cases with the same outcome. This means looking at whether there are conditions which always occur when the outcome (EFEQ) is present. We analysed each condition separately and also the negations of all conditions. Technically the outcome is the subset of the condition (see Figure 2) . Thus the threshold for necessity is high -it is recommended to be higher than 0.75, ideally above 0.9 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010) . As the results indicate (Table I) , there are no conditions which reach the most conservatively required necessity level (0.9), although the single condition that is close (0.88) is 'no tracking' (~T).
Notes: ~ indicates the negation, i.e. the absence of condition. Consistency is the degree of sub-set relationship of necessity. Coverage is the proportion of membership in the outcome explained by the solution (Ragin, 2008) . A scatter-plot of the outcome and 'no-tracking' condition ( Figure 2) shows that the Netherlands is the only strong case which contradicts (outcome present while condition absent) our hypothesis, as we know from the methodology that in the case of the necessary relationship, the outcome is the ~ subset of the condition (i.e. the outcome cannot be present while the condition is absent). The Netherlands is the case that has low scores of membership in ~T (i.e. it tracks students), but still shows good results in educational efficiency and equity.
Despite the latter limitation, we conclude that the analysis of the necessary conditions has lent support to our hypothesis that the no-tracking condition is a necessary -but not sufficientcondition for a good educational policy mix. This leads us to the next step of the analysissufficient combinations of conditions to contribute to the outcome, where we control for the hypotheses indicated in equation (2). 
EFFICIENCY AND NO ON THE X AND Y AXES SHOULD HAVE A CAPITAL LETTER. PLEASE SUPPLY A CORRECTED FIGURE
Sufficient Combinations of Conditions
We are after the combinations of conditions which contribute to the outcome. Latter means that we are looking for the sufficient institutional features of educational systems that will produce a good outcome. This means that we examine cases with the same causal conditions to see if they also share the same outcome. The main steps of this part of fuzzy-set analyses are: (1) specifying the truth table, i.e. transforming fuzzy-set membership scores into combinations of causal conditions; (2) determining frequency threshold (i.e. establishing a rule for determining which combinations of conditions are relevant -based on the number of cases with greater than 0.5 membership in each combination); (3) determining the consistency threshold (significance in quantitative terms) -that is, the degree of validity of the argument that a given combination of conditions is sufficient for the outcome to occur (0.75 was suggested as a minimum level by Ragin, 2008) ; (4) analysis using Boolean minimisation, which is basically the reduction of complex expressions into shorter, more parsimonious formulas. We have to test separately both of our 'configure choice properly' hypotheses -that is, our competition and good management hypotheses. In both cases we have 32 (2k, where k is the number of conditions included in the analyses) different combinations of conditions.
First we control for the 'competition hypotheses', equation (2.1). The first step is to show which combinations together with C and ~T are present, and for this, Table II was constructed. To improve readability we composes a typology of cases (column 'type' in Table II ) and indicated specific features of constructed types (column 'specific' in Table 2 ). It is clear that the criteria for the 'competition hypothesis' (i.e. the school systems which are based on public-private partnerships where the state grant applies equally to both) are met only in a few cases (Sweden and the Netherlands). These countries are also those which have extensive early childhood education systems. In addition, there are three choice cases (Denmark, England, Spain) that satisfy two of our three conditions (C and P are present, not T), and similarly there are four choice-intolerant cases (Hungary, Portugal, Germany, Austria) which have implemented an extensive private school system (P) but do not support the private system by equitable funding. However, Hungary and Denmark are the cases from these groups that display the outcome and whose success we are unable to explain. Additionally, there are six choice-intolerant cases which support private participation, but their share of private providers is low, though most of them are good cases (marked in bold). To conclude, Table II describes cases that are successful and satisfy our hypothesis completely or partially, but there are also cases that at least partially don't support our hypothesis (Equation 2.1.); thus, we turn to the second step of hypothesis testing.
Notes:
The main argument behind 'competition hypotheses' -C*P*F→EFEQ SENSE?. Cases which display the outcome are in bold. Small letters indicate 'no', i.e. c = no choice. As the second step we test with the help of a truth table the analytical differences and similarities between cases (Table III) . Truth tables are useful because, among other factors, they reveal the analytical differences and similarities between cases and indicate the degree of diversity in the data that is, they reveal which logically possible combinations of conditions are not observed empirically (Schneider & Grofman, 2006) . Boolean algebra is used to minimise the truth table [6] to indicate the solution formulas (see Table VI ). Following good practice and due to some drop in consistency level below 0.9, we chose 0.9 as the consistency threshold.
Notes: C, E, P and F are the conditions which WHOSE? configurational causality we test. 1 and 0 indicate membership in a particular condition (e.g. if C = 1 then the membership score in particular condition is > 0.5). The overview of all membership scores is in Appendix 1. Table III demonstrates that the combination of C*P*F is sufficient in contributing to a good outcome; however, the empirical coverage is moderate (only two cases: the Netherlands and Sweden). The most representative type ~C*E*~P*F has three cases. Thus, although our results are consistent, our main limitation is the low coverage (i.e. the LOW empirical relevance of configurations). This problem of limited diversity is unfortunately usual in mid-range case analyses, which we will also address later. Still, there are cases present that satisfy our consistency threshold and are consistent with our hypothesis -namely, the Netherlands and Sweden. Yet, there are additional paths to good policy outcome suggested by the truth table, the most representative one being ~C*E*~P*F. Finland drops out from this category due to the fact that condition E (enrolment in early childhood education at the age of three) is not met (~E). Only about 50% of Finnish children between 3 and 6 participate in publicly organised early childhood education; however, others have access to publicly financed private or home day-care. In the case of six-yearold children, the situation is, however, different, because almost all of them take part in free halfday preschool introduced in 2000 (OECD, 2006) . Second, we controlled for the 'good management hypothesis' (equation 2.2). Again we show the cases that represent certain combinations of conditions, and have created a typology based on these configurations (Table IV) . It is shown that we have choice cases both with the properties of good management (AU*AC) and without. Again the Netherlands and Sweden appear as role models, in addition to England and Denmark. None of the successful (EFEQ > 0.5) 'no-choice' cases has the property of 'good management'. There is one no-choice configuration (~C*~T*~E*AU*AC) with a 'good management' combination (AU*AC), but it does not obtain the outcome (Slovakia). At the same time, there are four cases with a good policy outcome (Estonia, Hungary, Iceland and Slovenia), which have no 'accountability' membership, accompanied by cases without 'autonomy' membership (Poland and Norway), that don't support our hypothesis. From our analytical perspective these are probably the cases that take international policy recommendations seriously, but have not managed to develop a thorough policy mix for good management.
The main argument behind 'good management hypotheses' -C*AU*AC→EFEQ SENSE?. Cases which display the outcome are in bold. Small letters indicate 'no', i.e. c = no choice. Second, THIRD? we composed a truth table (Table V) for testing 'good management hypotheses' (Equation 2.2). In this case our consistency threshold was 0.85 (again, this threshold is justified by the QCA's good practice GUIDELINES -0.8 as the suggested minimum -and by the consistency levels of particular analyses), that gives us 11 'good' cases. Coverage was higher in this case than in the previous case, and included mostly good outcome cases.
Notes: C, E, AU and AC are the conditions which WHOSE? configurations we test. 1 and 0 indicate membership in a particular condition (e.g. if C = 1 then the membership score in particular condition is > 0.5). The overview of all membership scores is in Appendix 1. Table VI can be considered to show the final policy recommendations as the results of STEMMING FROM fsQCA that will lead to good policy outcomes. There are alternative paths towards a good educational policy outcome (EFEQ). Considering Ireland to be a deviant case, we found two sufficient configurations in the case of the 'competition' hypotheses, one with and one without choice; and three SUFFICIENT CONFIGURATIONS in the case of 'good management' hypotheses, one with and two without choice.
Moreover, DESPITE having a large discussion and policy shift toward choice, we have shown that choice per se is not, however, sufficient for educational efficiency and equity. We propose and empirically show that other (combinations of) conditions are relevant too -not only 'choice' in combination with the 'no tracking' (our necessary condition) and 'competition' or 'good management' configurations. As Table VI indicates, there are no-choice systems with a variety of configurations that end up with a good outcome. Thus, choice is rather an INUS condition -an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition.
Since the necessary condition (no tracking) is by definition unavoidable for the good outcome, we may add this condition to all combinations. The first configuration, C*E*P*F→EFEQ (Table VI) , indicates that we find some evidence that 'competition' can lead to a good policy mix (Equation 2.1). However, there are only two cases -the Netherlands and Sweden -that give us empirical grounding. There are four case groups that provide evidence of good management (configuration C*E*AC*AU→EFEQ -the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and England -though the latter is not a good outcome country). In the case of no-choice countries, there are countries with good outcomes that don't contradict our hypothesis -Estonia, Norway, Slovenia, for instance, display good policy outcomes, while in terms of 'competition' hypotheses, neither C nor P is present. Similarly the in case of 'good management' hypotheses, Iceland, Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary only follow school autonomy in combination with other sufficient conditions, and two cases -Norway and Poland -only FOLLOW accountability in combination with other sufficient conditions. ~ ~ Conclusively we found that the two hypotheses (Equation 2.1) and (Equation 2.2) are supported only in choice combinations -that is, the combinations argued in the literature as being complementary for a good policy mix turned out to be present in countries where choice and competition has been a clear policy direction. In other cases, neither the 'competition hypotheses' nor the 'good management hypotheses' found confirmation. In terms of the explanatory quality of the solutions, the 'competition hypotheses' is marginally more consistent (the countries' membership scores are better in the case of particular configurations), but the empirical coverage is less sound -we have explained 66% of our sample. On the contrary, in the case of good management the coverage is good -we explain 84% of cases, while the consistency is lower than before (87%). For a detailed overview of which countries' educational success we are able to explain and which we cannot explain, see Appendices 3 and 4. To conclude, the overall quality in terms of consistency and coverage is not bad, although unique coverage indicate to the idiosyncrasies, WE MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THE IDIOSYNCRATIC NATURE OF MANY OF OUR CASES -THAT IS, THE FACT that almost every case has its own specificities. Also, the hypotheses are more suitable for explaining choice cases than for the nochoice cases, as expected.
Conclusions
The initial reforms of CONCERNED WITH school choice -voucher schemes of different kinds to support low-SES children's attendance at private schools and the abolition of strict catchment areas -were mainly aimed at improving educational equity. Moreover, proponents of the freedom of parents to choose argue that choice is democratic because it has the potential to improve poor people's access to quality education (e.g. Gorard et al, 2003) . However, the empirical evidence is not always supportive of this equity-conducive argument. The NPM-inspired reforms and policies that introduce competition, choice and market forces into the school system have been shown to have a strong potential to shift school systems to a higher level of efficiency. At the same time, as highlighted in the school-choice context, the generally observed empirical outcome, noted across different disciplinary literatures and a range of methodological approaches, is that there are differences in outcomes across DEPENDING ON the social status of parents -that is, low-SES children go to 'less good' schools (e.g. Burgess & Briggs, 2006) .
We conducted a comparative study of 20 European education systems to fill the research gap existing in the literature on comparing limited so-called medium n cases. Our aim was to integrate existing theoretical knowledge about good educational policy, and empirical evidence. By good policy, we mean institutional features of the policy mix for creating educational efficiency and equity simultaneously. For the empirical investigation, we found fuzzy-set analysis to be appropriate. Our analysis tested three hypotheses: (1) tracking is harmful ('no tracking' is a necessary condition); (2) the right configuration of choice policy entails 'competition' or 'good management' of schools; and (3) choice is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition, but rather an INUS condition to good policy outcome.
Our results indicate that choice can be one of the conditions needed to produce the good policy outcome and in such cases choice is only one of the necessary conditions. However, there are other sufficient combinations of conditions where membership of a choice-set is not necessary. In addition, we found that 'no tracking' is (with some reservations concerning the Netherlands in particular) the necessary condition for a good outcome. The combinations argued in the literature to be complementary for a good policy outcome turned out to be sound only in countries where choice and competition have been clear policy directions (the Netherlands and Sweden mostly). In choice-intolerant cases, we were not able to show that 'good management' or 'competition' can bring about educational efficiency and equity. The countries with the best choice practices can be considered to be Sweden (good management and competition), Denmark (good management) and the Netherlands (good management and competition, but tracking). The Dutch experience is interesting and exceptional due to many aspects. First, the twin principles of allowing parents to choose schools for their children and giving schools operational autonomy (i.e. the principle of freedom of education) is deeply embedded in the country's rhetoric. Pillarisation, A SYSTEM which means that both parents and schools are free to engage in the type of education that they choose and gain public support for these choices through an equalised funding formula (in Netherlands the school gets extra funding for admitting children from disadvantaged backgrounds), has somehow managed to include choice and pedagogical diversity within the education system without substantial segregation, and this explains the success in spite of the tacking TRACKING tradition.
Also we have demonstrated that there are multiple ways of configuring good policy. It is worth mentioning that many no-choice countries (e.g. Estonia, Poland, Slovenia) perform well. One such outstanding and well-known case is Finland. However, other similar types of policies that are intolerant of choice (e.g. in Slovakia and the Czech Republic) are not so successful. This indicates that our analysis suits hypothesis testing related to choice regimes, and no-choice regimes are currently simply empirical reminders OF THIS FACT. Thus, our findings also reveal that in a Europe-wide analysis, finding a common explanation for efficiency and equity is difficult. As the analyses have shown, many solutions formula FORMULAIC SOLUTIONS are based on only one or two empirical cases, and they tend to be more explanatory in the case of choice-tolerant systems.
Thus we have several limitations. First, although the levels of consistency are quite good, we are still not able to explain many cases -that is, there are plenty of successful cases (cases which show a positive outcome, Finland particularly), but the success is not explained by the analysis. The second limitation concerns the number of cases versus the number of possible configurations -that is, the problem of limited diversity. The first limitation is caused by country specificities that we are not able to control. For instance, it is argued that choice policies may work best where major equity problems have already been resolved -that is, despite the similarity of formal regulations concerning policy actions, the educational outcome is dependent on the societal context. The second limitation is related to the so-called limited diversity problem -that is, the more specifically we are willing to describe the policy mix, the more conditions we have to include in the analyses. Each extra condition in the analyses causes a powering effect of logically possible combinations (2k, where k is the number of combinations), which in turn challenges the opportunity of FINDING empirical matches. Thus, the analyses in QCA are always some sort of compromise between the simplification of research problems (in terms of describing dimensions) and empirical relevance.
Furthermore, the kind of structuralist approach applied in this particular article highlights the aspects related to formal institutions only and limits the definition of institutions more broadly due to rules of the game that develop in certain contexts. However, we are optimistic that digging deeper into the cases and finding the roots of values, norms and historical path-dependencies will add to the knowledge base by better explaining the diversity of educational policies.
Notes
[1] In fuzzy-set QCA, what we call conditions are independent variables in the classical approach, and outcome is the dependent variable.
[2] INUS condition means that this is an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient combination of conditions. [3] In fuzzy-set OCA, instead of 'combinations' the term 'configuration' is often used to refer to the arrangement of the conditions (not all have to be included) that take a certain value (between 0 and 1) that allows a logical algorithm to be run based on tests using Boolean algebra. CORRECT AS EDITED? [4] A good outcome is the score obtained by the Boolean multiplication of educational efficiency and equity scores that is above the 0.5 threshold. The closer the score is to 1, the more ideal the outcome of the policy mix is.
[5] Negation can be expressed either by dilde EXPLAIN DILDE? SHOULD IT READ 'A TILDE'? or by small LOWERCASE? letters, as occurs later on in the analyses.
[6] Boolean minimisation is the reduction of a long, complex expression into a shorter, more parsimonious expression. Logical AND or intersection (*) refers to the combination of sets -that is, the combination of conditions leading to the outcome. For minimisation, the researcher needs to decide what level of consistency is high enough to code the outcome as present, with consistency being the degree to which cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome (Ragin, 2008) . Coverage indicates the empirical importance -the number of cases following a specific causal path to the outcome divided by the total number of instances of the outcome (Ragin, 2008 
